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BALAZS HORVATHY*
OPINION 2/15 OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE NEW 
PRINCIPLES OF COMPETENCE ALLOCATION IN EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
– A SOLID FOOTING FOR THE FUTURE?
Abstract
In economic terms, the Common Commercial Policy is the most important policy area in 
EU external relations, needing a solid and predictable framework in terms of allocation of 
competences and national sovereignty. This paper addresses these facets of Opinion 2/15, 
which – in the context of the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (EUSFTA) – claried the 
division of competences between the European Union and the Member States in relation 
to international trade policy.
I. Introduction
Cecilia Malström, the EU Commissioner for Trade, is strikingly active on social media 
networks and her concise comments on recent developments of the EU external trade 
policy always are inspirational for headlines. In May 2017, followers of her Twitter account 
were informed on Malmström’s relevant observation straight after the Court of Justice 
announced Opinion 2/15 concerning the conclusion of Free Trade Agreement negotiated 
between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore (EUSFTA).1 Commissioner 
Malmström claimed that the Court’s “[o]pinion should put us on solid footing for the 
future […]” and expressed her commitment to work with the Governments and the 
European Parliament to de#ne the way forward,2 indicating that the Court’s Opinion 
clari#es all sort of questions regarding the Common Commercial Policy (CCP).
In economic terms, the CCP is the most important policy area in the EU external 
relations and therefore it is indisputable that the CCP would need a solid framework 
and clarity relating to its EU law setting. This ‘solid footing’ might be essential, especially 
to the Member States, as the competence in the CCP is conferred exclusively on the 
European Union, consequently the allocation and scope of the competence might raise 
concerns about sovereignty and national regulatory freedom as well. This paper aims at 
* Research fellow, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences, Institute for Legal Studies 
(H-1097 Budapest, Toth Kalman u. 4.); associate professor, Szechenyi Istvan University, Faculty of Law and 
Political Sciences (H-9026 Györ, Aldozat u. 12.). E-mail: horvathy.balazs@tk.mta.hu.
1 Opinion of the Court 2/15., ECLI:EU:C:2017:376.
2 Tweet of Cecilia Malmström (@MalmstromEU), commissioner for trade (EU external trade policy). Available 
at https://twitter.com/MalmstromEU/status/864427382647738368 .
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reviewing these aspects of Opinion 2/15 and assessing its implications on the competence 
allocation between the European Union and the Member States.
II. CCP and the ‘New Generation’ Free Trade Agreements
The EUSFTA is a new generation trade and investment agreement3 that covers not only 
the standard free trade issues but also lays down provisions concerning investments 
and non-trade concerns, e.g. sustainable development and environmental protection. 
These agreements are de#nitely opening a new era in international economic relations 
and generate the need to rethink the concepts of state sovereignty and autonomy.4 In 
EU policy, the ‘new generation agreements’ are rooted in the European Union’s Global 
Europe strategy5 that paved the way to an ambitious trade agenda and a new approach 
to the negotiations of trade agreements. It is notable for the current case of EUSFTA, that 
the investment chapter of these ‘new generation agreements’ usually lays down detailed 
provisions with regard to the investment activities, such as investment protection, 
obligations and regulatory leeway of the host states, principles of appropriation.6 
Moreover, procedural rules are also enshrined in these agreements in order to facilitate the 
enforcement of their provisions and reconcile disputes between the contracting parties 
(state-state dispute settlement, SSDS) as well between investors and states (investor-state 
dispute settlement, ISDS). The overall objective of these agreements is to provide legal 
certainty to investors operating in the EU or in third countries concerned. The EUSFTA 
follows this line and covers substantial provisions beyond trade in goods, therefore, 
in the terminology of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the EUSFTA encompasses 
both ‘WTO+’7 and ‘WTO-x’8 rules. The investment provisions included in Chapter Nine of 
EUSFTA address a relatively broad range of issues.9 The ‘new generation agreements’, as 
3 For a comprehensive analysis of the new generation agreements see Ewa Zelazna, New Generation of EU 
Regional Trade Agreements, 1 Lund Student EU Law Review 1 (2012).
4 Csongor István Nagy, Free Trade, Public Interest and Reality: New Generation Free Trade Agreements and National 
Regulatory Sovereignty, 9 Czech Yearbook of International Law, 197–216, 198 (2018).
5 European Commission: Global Europe: Competing in the World, COM (2006) 567 #nal.
6 In general, see ZOLTÁN VÍG & SLOBODAN DOKLESTIĆ, REQUIREMENTS OF LAWFUL TAKING OF FOREIGN PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2016).
7 So called WTO+ (WTO plus) provisions: all commitments building on those already agreed to at the 
multilateral level, see HENRIK HORN & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & ANDRÉ SAPIR, BEYOND THE WTO? AN ANATOMY OF EU AND 
US PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 3–7 (2009).
8 WTO-x (WTO extra) commitments dealing with issues going beyond the current WTO mandate, e.g. on 
labor standards. See id. at 4.
9 The Commission, however, intended originally to negotiate an agreement without investment provisions and 
its mandate has been extended to an investment chapter only afterwards. See details below. The Chapter 
encompasses the provisions on investment protection, lays down the de#nition of investment, which is 
based on the standard concept enshrined in several BITs (every kind of asset which has the characteristics 
of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the 
expectation of gain or pro#t, the assumption of risk, or a certain duration). Moreover, EUFSTA covers also 
requirements concerning national treatment, fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security, 
as well as compensation for losses su%ered owing to war or other events (armed con&ict, revolution, a 
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EUSFTA is also indicating, are becoming more important and will gradually replace the 
Member States’ BITs, as the founding treaty provides the European Union with exclusive 
competence in the #eld of foreign direct investments. Even though the Lisbon Treaty 
extended the competence of the CCP to new areas, including investments, the character 
and scope of the competence has left questions unanswered.
This ambiguity over the competences, however, has always been seen during the 
evolution of the CCP. At the very outset, the founding treaties remained silent on the 
competence over the CCP, and the Court’s intensive case law was to establish the concept 
of exclusivity in the 1970s.10 The underlying arguments behind the exclusive competence 
character were the establishment of the customs union, the common interest, and the 
requirement that the CCP should be based on uniform principles. This argumentation 
expressed the need for unity of action of the Member States in the area of the external 
trade, e.g. the unity of positions in trade negotiations. The line of reasoning on the ‘uniform 
principles’11 referred to the fact that the internal market and the customs union would 
be inoperable if the Member States would have retained the competence to implement 
di%erent trade policies. Moreover, di%erent trade policies could set o% distortions in the 
internal market as well. Therefore the Court’s extensive case law resulted in a shift of 
competence over trade policy, drastically limiting the autonomy of the Member States 
in this area.
The ECJ clearly established the exclusive nature of the competence in its case law but 
this only re&ected on the vertical allocation of competences between the EU and Member 
States, and did not specify which subjects were covered by the EU competence. Therefore, 
it is also important to identify the extent of the competence because the EU can exercise 
its powers exclusively within the material scope of the CCP. The Treaty originally laid down 
an exempli#cative list of subjects relating to trade in goods, where the Community was 
empowered to act. However, from quite early on, the Court has gone beyond this narrow 
scope. The Court recapped the CCP in a wide and dynamic interpretation and did not 
restrict the CCP to instruments intended to have an e%ect only on the traditional aspects of 
external trade. In line with this approach, international commodity agreements,12 customs 
valuation,13 or the Generalized System of Preferences introduced by the Community,14 
had to be regarded as part of the CCP, even if the founding treaty did not make any 
reference to these subjects. Later the Court limited this dynamism and took a more 
restrained view of the extent of the EU’s competence. In Opinion 1/94,15 the Court had 
state of national emergency, revolt, insurrection or riot), provisions of expropriation, and speci#c ISDS 
mechanisms.
10 See especially Case 8/73 Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v Massey-Ferguson, ECLI:EU:C:1973:90; Opinion of 11 
November 1975 in Case 1/75 Local Cost Standard, ECLI:EU:C:1975:145, Case 41/76 Donckerwolcke v Procureur 
de la République, ECLI:EU:C:1976:182.
11 See Case 174/84 Bulk Oil (Zug) AG v Sun International Limited and Sun Oil Trading Company, ECLI:EU:C:1986:60, 
para 29.
12 Opinion of 4 October 1979 in Case 1/78 Natural Rubber, ECLI:EU:C:1979:224.
13 Case 8/73 Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v Massey-Ferguson GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:1973:90.
14 Case 45/86 Commission v Council, ECLI:EU:C:1987:163.
15 Opinion of 15 November 1994 in Case 1/94 WTO, ECLI:EU:C:1994:384.
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to give an Opinion whether the Community had the competence to conclude all parts of 
the WTO Agreement on an exclusive basis. Even though the ECJ verbally kept the open 
nature of CCP16 and held that the Community had exclusive competence to conclude 
multilateral agreements on trade in goods, the Community’s competence did not cover 
the most part of subjects related to GATS and TRIPS. Therefore the WTO agreement fell in 
part within the competence of the Community and in part within that of the Members 
States and had to be concluded as a mixed agreement. This limited approach was 
represented also in subsequent Treaty amendments but the Treaty of Lisbon #nally made 
major progress on consolidating the exclusive competence character and transferred 
key external trade policy competences to the supranational level.17 The new language 
of Article 207 TFEU encompasses not only trade in services and the commercial aspects 
of intellectual property but also foreign direct investments.18 As a result, the scope of the 
CCP has been extended to negotiations by the EU on agreements covering investment 
issues. 19 The TFEU explicitly lays down that the EU has exclusive competence in the areas 
of the CCP20 and even the objectives of the CCP refer to the FDI as well.21
It was important also for the EUSFTA that these provisions have not been fully 
clear about the extent of the new competences conferred on the European Union as 
the TFEU applies the term ‘foreign direct investment’ without any de#nition. It was 
argued that the notion of FDI obviously di%ers from the term established in the WTO 
terminology which uses ‘trade related investment measures.’22 Compared to this, the 
16 Opinion of 15 November 1994 in Case 1/94 WTO, ECLI:EU:C:1994:384, para 41.
17 Marc Bungenberg, Außenbeziehungen und Außenhandelspolitik, 44 Europarecht Beiheft 1 (2009); Jan 
Ceyssens, Towards a Common Foreign Investment Policy? – Foreign Investment in the European Constitution, 
32 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 3 (2005); Christoph Herrmann, Die Zukunft der mitgliedstaatlichen 
Investitionspolitik nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, 21 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 6 (2010); 
Ste%en Hindelang & Niklas Maydell, Die Gemeinsame Europäische Investitionspolitik – Alter Wein in neuen 
Schläuchen? in INTERNATIONALER INVESTITIONSSCHUTZ UND EUROPARECHT (Marc Bungenberg & Joern Griebel & Ste%en 
Hindelang eds., 2010); Joachim Karl, The Competence for Foreign Direct Investment – New Powers for the EU, 
5 Journal of World Investment & Trade 3 (2004); László Knapp, Mixed Agreements and the Treaty of Lisbon in 
COFOLA 2010 – THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 1539–1553 (Nadezda Rozehnalová & Roman Onderka eds., 2010); 
Markus Krajewski, External Trade Law and the Constitutional Treaty, 42 Common Market Law Review 1 (2005).
18 Article 207 (1) TFEU.
19 It should be mentioned here that despite the lack of competence, the Commission made attempts to have 
the support of the Member States to include investment provisions already before the Treaty of Lisbon, see 
Niklas Maydell, The European Community´s Minimum Platform on Investment or the Trojan Horse of Investment 
Competence in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN CONTEXT 73–92 (August Reinisch & Christina Kahr eds., 2008).
20 Article 3 (1) (e) TFEU. In addition to the explicit competence, the EU holds also ‘implied powers’, see Article 3 
(2) TFEU: “The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement 
when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to 
exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may a%ect common rules or alter their scope.” 
Inclusion of this provision in the TEU, however, is merely a codi#cation of a principle established by the ECJ 
alredy in 1971 in Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (ERTA), 1971 ECR 263.
21 See Article 206 TFEU. The EU must contribute “[...] in the common interest, to the harmonious development of 
world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, 
and the lowering of customs and other barriers.”
22 The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) has been adopted as a part of the Marrakesh 
Agreements. The EU was already empowered for topics that are covered by the TRIMs agreement even 
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standard interpretation of ‘foreign direct investment’ implies a much wider term covering 
not only trade related aspects but the whole concept of direct investment activities 
conducted by EU investors in third countries or conversely, by third country investors in 
the European Union.23 Reference to “FDI” also indicates a terminological restriction, since 
FDI speci#cally refers to ‘direct’ investments. This poses the question which factors can 
determine whether an investment activity is ‘direct’. The notion can be traced back to the 
internal market provisions regarding the free movement of capital.24 The CJEU has also 
applied the distinction between indirect and direct investments in a number of cases.25 
According to these interpretations, ‘direct investment’ covers all cross-border investment 
transactions conducted by natural or legal person investors, where the investor makes 
capital available to an undertaking in order to establish or maintain lasting and direct 
economic ties with this undertaking. If the investment is carried out by acquisition of 
shares from an undertaking (company), only transactions can be regarded as ‘direct 
investment‘, in which the shares enable the investor to participate e%ectively in the 
management of that undertaking or in its control. 26 Following these lines of arguments, 
it is plausible that ‘foreign direct investments’ do not cover portfolio investments when 
the investors want to get shares in a company only for reason of making short-term 
pro#ts without any intention to control or manage the target company.27 It means that 
the di%erence between direct and indirect investments lays in the intention of control of 
the undertaking. However objective criteria are also applied for making the distinction 
easier. The Court’s case law follows the method elaborated by the IMF that considers all 
acquisitions in a company below 10% of shares necessarily as portfolio investment,28 
before the Lisbon amendment, see Markus Krajewski, External Trade Law and the Constitutional Treaty, 42 
Common Market Law Review 16 (2005), and commentary to Article 207, in DAS RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION 
(Eberhardt Grabitz & Meinhard Hilf & Martin Nettesheim eds., 43th ed., 2011).
23 According to Article 207 (1) TFEU, transactions carried out by EU investors in the EU internal market are not 
to be regarded as ‘foreign’ investments. These investments fall within the internal market competence. For 
further analysis, see: Christoph Herrmann, Die Zukunft der mitgliedstaatlichen Investitionspolitik nach dem 
Vertrag von Lissabon, 21 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 6 (2010), and Ste%en Hindelang & Niklas 
Maydell, Die Gemeinsame Europäische Investitionspolitik – Alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen? in INTERNATIONALER 
INVESTITIONSSCHUTZ UND EUROPARECHT (Marc Bungenberg & Joern Griebel & Ste%en Hindelang eds., 2010).
24 Council 88/361/EEC Directive of 24 June 1988 for the Implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty.
25 The term ‘direct investments’ is also applied by the provisions on the free movement of capital in Articles 
63–66 TFEU. The Court of Justice interpreted and de#ned this term in a number of cases, see for instance: 
Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ECLI:EU:C:2006:774; 
Case C-157/05 Holböck v. Finanzamt Salzburg-Land, ECLI:EU:C:2007:297, para 34; Case C-112/05 Commission 
v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2007:623, para 18; Case C-101/05 Skatteverket v. A., ECLI:EU:C:2007:804, para 46; Case 
C-194/06 Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. Orange European Smallcap Fund NV., ECLI:EU:C:2008:289, para 
100; Case C-274/06 Commission v. Spain, ECLI:EU:C:2008:86; para 18; Case C-326/07 Commission v. Italy, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:193, para 35.
26 See the above cited case law, speci#cally: C-446/04, para 182; C-157/05, para 35; C-112/05, para 18; C-194/06, 
para 101; C-326/07, para 35.
27 See the Court’s de#nition of ‘portfolio investments’: “[…] acquisition of shares on the capital market solely 
with the intention of making a #nancial investment without any intention to in&uence the management 
and control of the undertaking (‘portfolio’ investments).” Joined Cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission 
v. Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2006:608, para 19.
28 See IMF, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL 86–87 (5th. ed., 1993): “[…] a direct investment enterprise is de#ned 
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although from the very outset, the Court applied additional criteria as well. Accordingly, 
the CJEU highlighted that not only the proportion of the shares can determine the 
nature of a transaction, but other factors, e.g. special forms of participation in the 
management, or particular provisions of the domestic company law, might also be 
decisive.29 These interpretations, however, left important questions unanswered. Therefore 
the negotiations of the new generation trade agreements opened a debate over the 
scope of competences and their allocation between the EU and the Member States. The 
seminal case in this debate was the CJEU Opinion procedure on EUSFTA.
III. The EUSFTA and Lack of Clarity on the Scope of the Competence
The EUSFTA was the result of a #ve years long negotiation but the original idea to 
conclude a wider, regional agreement with the ASEAN countries (Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations), dates back to earlier times. In 2006, the Commission intended to open 
negotiations with ASEAN but this ‘interregional’ approach proved to be unsuccessful and 
the negotiations were suspended. Consequently, the Commission changed this approach 
and proposed bilateral agreements to be concluded with individual ASEAN countries. 
The Council adopted the Commission’s mandate for negotiations with Singapore in 
2009 and the negotiations were launched in 2010.30 In the beginning, the mandate did 
not cover investments but the Council extended the scope of negotiations and added 
investments to the mandate in 2011. The text of EUSFTA was initialled in 2015.
It was not surprising that no compromise was found between the Council and the 
Commission on the competence distribution for the agreement, since the Treaty, as 
examined in the previous subchapter, was not fully clear about the scope of the EU 
exclusive competence. Therefore, the Commission submitted a request for an Opinion 
procedure before the Court on the allocation of competences between the EU and the 
Member States concerning the conclusion of EUSFTA. The Commission sought guidance 
from the CJEU on whether the EUSFTA had to be concluded as an agreement between the 
EU and Singapore, without participation of the Member States, or as a mixed agreement 
that requires rati#cation on behalf of the Member States as well.31
[…] as an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which a direct investor, who is resident in another 
economy, owns 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power (for an incorporated enterprise) 
or the equivalent (for an unincorporated enterprise). […]” This requirement can give guidance also for the 
interpretation of the treaty, however it can be established only as a presumption (i.e., in certain cases, also 
an ownership interest below 10% can be understood as direct investment).
29 See the above cited case law, C-446/04, para 182.
30 The #rst country, the EU commenced negotiations with, was Singapore.
31 The Opinion procedure related only to the issue of whether the EU has exclusive competence and the 
Court did not examine whether the content of the agreement is compatible with EU law. The Commission 
submitted the following four questions: Does the Union have the requisite competence to sign and conclude 
alone the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore? More speci#cally, which provisions of the agreement fall 
within the Union’s exclusive competence? Which provisions of the agreement fall within the Union’s shared 
competence?; Is there any provision of the agreement that falls within the exclusive competence of the 
Member States?
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The Commission’s main position was that the EU has exclusive competence to 
conclude the EUSFTA alone. The Commission argued, #rst, that most parts of the 
agreement come within the exclusive competence under Article 207 TFEU. According 
to the Commission, the competence covering other provisions not falling within the 
scope of Article 207 TFEU is also of exclusive nature resulting partly from a legislative 
act giving authority for that,32 or from the fact that conclusion of the EUSFTA may a%ect 
common rules or alter their scope.33 Similarly, the European Parliament shared the view 
that the Agreement should be concluded by the EU on its own. However the Council and 
the Member States34 submitted observations in order to claim that the Member States 
should also be a contracting party to the Agreement for the reason that certain topics 
of the Agreement fall within the shared competence of the EU and the Member States 
and some parts remained even in the (exclusive) competence of the Member States.
IV. The Opinion of the Advocate General
Advocate General Sharpston submitted an analytical and detailed Opinion to the 
procedure on 21 December 201635 and took the view that the EUSFTA can be concluded 
only by the European Union and the Member States acting jointly. Even though the major 
part of the agreement fell into the exclusive competence of the European Union, the 
Advocate General found that the European Union’s external competence was shared 
on several topics, including the provisions on types of investment other than foreign 
direct investment.
The Advocate General gave a very detailed insight into the Treaty provisions as well 
as the permanent case law with respect to the exclusive competences in the CCP and 
aimed at establishing the material scope of the EU competence. This framework was 
then applied to the text of EUSFTA. The Opinion analysed the agreement from chapter 
to chapter and suggested deliminations for the subjects falling within the exclusive EU 
competence, shared competences between the EU and the Member States, and the 
competences retained by the Member States at the domestic level.
According to the Advocate Generat, the subjects of the EU exclusive competence 
cover the standard matters of trade in goods, services (including rail and road transport 
services), commercial aspects of intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment. 
Regarding the meaning of FDI, the Advocate General relied on the concept established 
in the Court’s case law.36 Keeping in line with the Commission’s submission, the Advocate 
General argued that the objectives and general provisions of EUSFTA also fell within 
the scope of the CCP as those provisions corresponded with the objectives laid down 
in Article 206 TFEU or were purely accessory and therefore these provisions were not 
32 See the #rst ground under Article 3 (2) TFEU.
33 See the third ground under Article 3 (2) TFEU.
34 All Member States submitted written observations with the exception of Belgium, Croatia, Estonia and 
Sweden.
35 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in procedure 2/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:992.
36 See the previous sub-chapter above.
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such as to alter the allocation of competences between the European Union and the 
Member States as regards the other provisions of the EUSFTA.37 It was crucial from the 
perspective of EUSFTA whether the dispute settlement and other procedural provisions 
(mediation, transparency mechanisms) might be established on the basis of the EU 
competence. In the Advocate General’s reasoning, the dispute settlement and mediation 
mechanisms are ancillary in nature. Consequently the allocation of competences in those 
#elds should be done in the same way as the substantive provisions to which they relate.38 
The EU enjoyed exclusive competence in those #elds in so far as those provisions applied 
to ancillary parts of the agreement falling within the scope of the exclusive competence. 
Along with the latter areas, the assessment of the Advocate General also touched upon 
the competences vis-à-vis competition and related issues. Sharpston’s Opinion followed 
the arguments of the Commission and held that the link between international trade 
and competition policy might be reasonably established. This connection can be seen 
in certain provisions in the WTO agreements and the detailed analysis of the related 
chapters in EUSFTA showed, according to the Opinion, that the provisions are covered 
by the CCP. The Opinion also highlighted that the EU enjoyed competence even relating 
to those provisions of EUSFTA that required harmonization of competition rules in 
some degree. This was because these harmonization requirements stemmed from 
competition law provisions of EU law the agreement extended to Singapore, or provisions 
concerning cooperation and coordination in law enforcement that were all ancillary to 
the main substantive obligations set out in EUSFTA.39 Moreover it is also notable, how 
the Advocate General evaluated the position of the ‘trade and environment’ issues. The 
EUSFTA lays down provisions regarding the investments in renewable energy sectors in 
a separate chapter40 and in accordance with the major objectives of the ‘new generation 
agreements’, contains a complete set of rules on sustainable development.41 Sharpston 
referred conceptually to the consistency requirement of the Treaty between the CCP 
and the general objectives and principles of EU external relations and made plausible 
that levels of environmental protection demonstrated links with international trade.42
Regarding investments in renewable energy sectors, the Opinion argued that these 
provisions in EUSFTA are limited to measures which may a%ect trade and investment that 
are primarily concerned with regulating commercial policy instruments and eliminating 
trade and investment barriers and have direct and immediate e%ects on trade. Therefore, 
the exclusive competence of the EU can be based on the CCP. Similarly, she found that to 
some extent, trade and sustainable development relate to commercial policy instruments, 
therefore these elements thereof establish the exclusive competence at EU level.43
37 Advocate General’s Opinion, para 136.
38 Advocate General’s Opinion, paras 523–529.
39 Advocate General’s Opinion, paras 459–465.
40 EUSFTA, Chapter Seven.
41 EUSFTA, Chapter Thirteen.
42 473–483.
43 Advocate General’s Opinion, paras 484–504. The Opinion found the same conclusion relating to the 
conservation of marine biological resources.
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The competences shared with the Member States covered subjects that were 
partly related to the above issues, but were excluded from the scope of the exclusive 
competence. The provisions of the EUSFTA on trade in air transport services, maritime 
transport services and transport by inland waterway (including services inherently 
linked to those transport services), were not part of the trade in services competence. 
Even though the exclusive competence comprised government procurements as well, 
those relating to transport services and services inherently linked to transport services 
were exempted as falling within the scope of the shared competence.44 Similarly, 
Sharpston emphasized that EU has exclusive competence with regard to foreign 
direct investments as well as commercial aspects of IP rights. However, in the #elds of 
indirect investments and non-commercial aspects of intellectual property rights, the 
EU enjoys only competences shared with the Member States. Since the Opinion found 
the procedural provisions (ISDS, mediation, transparency mechanisms) as falling only 
partly within the exclusive competence, all aspects of EUSFTA’s procedural provisions 
were based on competences shared with the Member States that apply to the parts 
of the agreement for which the EU enjoys shared external competences. Moreover, 
the Opinion divided also the sustainable development chapter with respect to the 
available competence. In the Advocate General’s reasoning, the fundamental labor and 
environmental standards were not covered by Article 207 TFEU. Therefore these matters 
fell within the scope of either social policy or environmental policy – consequently the 
EU enjoyed only competences shared with the Member States.
It was signi#cant from the perspective of the competence allocation and the position 
of the Member States that the Opinion found also a subject where the EU was not 
empowered. Sharpston held that the EU had no external competence to agree to be 
bound by that part of the EUSFTA which terminated bilateral agreements concluded 
between certain Member States and Singapore. In her view, that competence belongs 
exclusively to the Member States concerned.45
V. The Opinion of the Court of Justice
The Court delivered its Opinion on 16 May 2017 and held that EUSFTA cannot be 
concluded by the European Union alone; therefore EUSFTA implies a ‘mixed’ agreement 
signed and concluded by both the EU and the Member States. The assessment of the 
exclusive competence for conclusion of EUSFTA was based on the standard approach 
conducted by the Court in the well-settled case law. The Court held that the CCP belongs 
within the context of the Union’s external action and thus the CCP relates to trade 
with non-EU countries.46 It was emphasized that only the fact that the measure has 
implications for international trade is not quite enough for deciding whether the subject 
is covered by the CCP. It can be classi#ed as falling within the scope of the CCP if it relates 
44 EUSFTA, Chapter Eight and Ten.
45 See Advocate General’s Opinion, para 563.
46 See Case C-414/11 Daiichi Sankyo and Sano-Aventis Deutschland, EU:C:2013:520, para 50; Judgment of 22 
October 2013, Case C-137/12 Commission v Council, EU:C:2013:675, para 56.
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speci#cally to international trade, which means that the measure is essentially intended 
to promote, facilitate, or govern trade, and has direct and immediate e%ects on trade. 
In other words, the existence of a speci#c link between the measure and international 
trade between the European Union and Singapore has to be established.47
Even though it is not expressly argued in the Opinion, it is obvious that this 
investigation is rooted conceptually in the case law on principles of choice of legal 
basis. More precisely, the assessment whether the EUSFTA falls within the scope of the 
CCP can be regarded as not only a question of the competence allocation between 
the EU and the Member States, but also as a question of delimitation of the Union’s 
policies. Therefore the Opinion is signi#cant for both the vertical and the horizontal 
aspects of the competence allocation. This conceptual basis is also palpable behind the 
reasoning, when the Court aims at #nding objective factors, e.g., the purpose and the 
content of matters laid down in EUSFTA. This approached follows a very similar logical 
pathway that the Court usually applies concerning the choice of legal basis, where a 
provision pursues two- or multifold purposes or objectives. Accordingly, the Court is 
looking intuitively for the main or predominant objective and identi#es the competence 
character of EUSFTA on the basis thereof.
Similar to the view of the Advocate General, the Court also found that the most part 
of the agreement can be covered by the exclusive competence of the CCP. However, 
disagreeing with the Advocate General, the Court’s Opinion scrutinized the status and 
competence character of certain EUSFTA chapters di%erently. These major di%erences are 
related to services (Chapter Eight), investment (Chapter Nine), government procurement 
(Chapter Ten), IP rights (Chapter Eleven), and environmental concerns (Chapter Thirteen). 
The position as well as the argumentation of the Court regarding these issues shall be 
discussed in some detail.
a) Services
The Advocate General held that major parts of the services were covered by the 
exclusive competence, including rail and road transport services, while other 
important areas were shared between the EU and the Member States (trade in air, 
maritime and inland waterway services). However, the Court did not fully share this 
view and reassessed the extent of the competence in this area. The Court did not 
di%erentiate between the types of activities covered by trade in services (‘modes’ in WTO 
47 Opinion of the Court 2/15., ECLI:EU:C:2017:376., paras 34–36. See, for related cases, inter alia, Case C-137/12 
Commission v Council, EU:C:2013:675, para 57, and Opinion of 14 February 2017 in Case 3/15 Marrakesh Treaty 
on Access to Published Works, EU:C:2017:114, para 61. For a general analysis, see Marise Cremona, Shaping 
EU trade policy post-Lisbon: Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017, 14 European Constitutional Law Review 1, 231–259 
(2018); Rumiana Yotova, Opinion 2/15 of the CJEU: Delineating the Scope of the New EU Competence in Foreign 
Direct Investment, The Cambridge Law Journal, 29–32 (2018); László Knapp, The Doctrine of Implied External 
Powers and the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement in THE INFLUENCE AND EFFECTS OF EU BUSINESS LAW IN THE WESTERN 
BALKANS (Judit Glavanits & Balázs Horváthy & László Knapp, eds., 2018, forthcoming); Charlotte Beaucillon, 
Opinion 2/15: Sustainable Is the New Trade. Rethinking Coherence for the New Common Commercial Policy, 2 
European Papers 3, 819–828 (2017).
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classi#cation)48 and found that there was no reason to make a distinction between the 
provisions relating to the cross-border supply of services and the supply of services by 
establishment or by the presence of natural persons. Thus, the Court held that all four 
modes fell within the scope of the CCP.49 As Article 207 (5) TFEU excludes the negotiation 
and conclusion of international agreements in the #eld of transport from the scope of the 
CCP, the Court examined speci#cally transport services regulated in the EUSFTA. Some of 
them were held to be ‘business services’ and not auxiliary services in the area of transport 
e.g., aircraft repair and maintenance services during which an aircraft is withdrawn from 
service; the selling and marketing of air transport services and computer reservation 
system services. The Court concluded that these three types of services were covered 
by the EU exclusive competence.50 For maritime, rail, and road transport services it was 
decisive that under Article 3 (2) TFEU and in line with the permanent case-law, the Treaty 
grants to the EU exclusive competence to conclude also agreements which may a%ect 
common rules or alter their scope. Considering the provisions of EUSFTA regarding the 
maritime, rail and road transport services, the Court concluded that these areas were 
largely covered by common rules already and may a%ect also common rules or alter their 
scope, therefore the EU enjoys exclusive competence in these areas. Concerning the 
internal waterways transport services, the Court, consistently with the permanent case 
law, found that there is no need to take into account of the provisions of an agreement, 
which are extremely limited in scope.51 As the provisions regarding those services were 
very marginal in EUSFTA, it did not imply the delimitation of the EU competence. For 
this reason the Court concluded that the EU had exclusive competence in respect of 
services (Chapter Eight) in its entirety.52
b) Investment
One of the most complex issue was the competence allocation in the area of investments. 
It follows from the above analysis that the Opinion of the Advocate General strictly 
delimited the competences for direct and indirect investments (falling within the 
exclusive and shared competences respectively), and also the competences regarding 
ISDS were split along this logic. The Court drew similar conclusions concerning investment 
48 Trade in services encompasses the following four modes of activities in the terminology of the WTO: the 
supply of a service from the territory of one WTO Member into the territory of another Member (mode 1); 
the supply of a service in the territory of one Member to the consumer of another Member (mode 2, the 
latter two modes are cross-border services); the supply of a service by a service provider of one Member 
through commercial presence in the territory of another Member (mode 3); and the supply of a service 
by a service provider of one Member through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of 
another Member (mode 4). This di%erentiation was also applied by the Court in its Opinion 1/94.
49 Opinion of the Court, paras 54–55. See for related case: Opinion 1/08, 30 November 2009, Agreements 
Modifying the Schedules of Specic Commitments under the GATS, EU:C:2009:739, paras 4 and 118 and 119.
50 Opinion of the Court, paras 64–68.
51 Opinion of the Court, para 217.
52 See id., and Opinion of the Court, para 69.
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protection and the competence nature of FDI and non-direct investment, but assessed 
the powers for ISDS di%erently.
The distinction between the two aspects of foreign investments was made on the 
basis of the permanent case law. Thus, the Court de#ned FDI as “[…] investments made 
by natural or legal persons of that third state in the European Union and vice versa which 
enable e%ective participation in the management or control of a company carrying out 
an economic activity.”53 On the other hand, non-direct investment concerns, inter alia, 
acquisition of company securities with the aim of making a #nancial investment without 
any intention to in&uence the management and control of the undertaking (portfolio 
investments).54 For the reason that the Treaty (Article 207 (1) TFEU) explicitly lists FDI as 
part of the CCP, it is undebatable that the foreign direct investment provisions fall within 
the exclusive competence of the EU. It follows also from this provision that the Treaty 
does not intend to include other foreign investment categories in the CCP. Therefore non-
direct investments (portfolio investments) are not covered by the CCP. The commitments 
in the EUSFTA relating to foreign investments, other than direct investments do not 
fall within the exclusive competence of the EU. The Court, however, assessed these 
investment activities to be covered by the movements of capital provisions (Article 63 
TFEU). Consequently non-direct investments fall within the shared competence between 
the EU and the Member States pursuant to Article 4 (2) (a) TFEU.55
The Court did not share the view of the Advocate General regarding investor-state 
dispute settlement provisions of EUSFTA. Sharpston found that ISDS is ancillary to the 
investment protection provisions. Therefore ISDS provisions related to FDI could be 
concluded within the scope of CCP but ISDS provisions concerning non-direct investment 
fall under shared competences. Contrary to this view, the Court considered that the 
whole concept of ISDS falls outside of the scope of the exclusive competence. The 
Court’s argument was that the ISDS regime removes disputes from the jurisdiction of 
the courts of the Member States. Therefore these provisions of EUSFTA cannot be of a 
purely ancillary nature. It follows that ISDS cannot be established without the consent 
of the Member States.56
The third major question regarding the investment chapter was, whether the 
competence over CCP empowers the EU to replace the BITs between the Member States 
and Singapore. The BITs concluded by the Member States with third countries are now 
authorized by a regulation adopted in 201257 that enables the Member States to maintain 
their BITs in force until the EU concludes an investment agreement with the same third 
country. The Advocate General held that the EU had no power to terminate these pre-
existing agreements but the Court took a di%erent view and found that provisions in 
the EUSFTA terminating the BITs concluded by the Member States with Singapore do 
53 Opinion of the Court, para 82.
54 Opinion of the Court, para 227.
55 Opinion of the Court, paras 240–242.
56 Opinion of the Court, para 292.
57 Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements Between Member States and 
Third Countries, [2012] OJ L351/40.
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not encroach upon a competence of the Member States, in so far as that provision 
relates to a #eld in respect of which the European Union has exclusive competence. 
The reasoning of the Court was based on the argument that if the EU negotiates and 
concludes an agreement with a third country relating to a #eld in respect of which it 
is empowered with exclusive competence, the EU replaces the Member States. In light 
of the well-settled case law,58 it was clear “[…] that the European Union can succeed 
the Member States in their international commitments when the Member States have 
transferred to it […] their competences relating to those commitments and it exercises 
those competences.”59 The EU has exclusive competence to terminate these agreements 
with respect to those provisions falling within the scope of FDI.60
c) Government Procurement
Contrary to the Advocate General’s Opinion, the Court held that the provisions of EUSFTA 
regarding government procurement should be based completely on the exclusive 
competence of the European Union. It was argued, that these rules speci#cally aim at 
laying down the requirements under which economic operators of each party of the 
agreement may participate in procurement procedures in the other contracting party. 
The Court emphasized, as those requirements are founded on considerations of non-
discriminatory access, transparency and e_ciency, they have direct and immediate 
e%ects on trade in goods and services between the EU and Singapore.61 Therefore these 
provisions were regarded as covered by the scope of the CCP. For the provisions on 
government procurement in the #eld of transport services, the Court followed the same 
logic and found an overriding argument in Article 3 (2) TFEU: since those related areas 
are already covered by common rules, the exclusive external competence for the whole 
Chapter Ten on government procurement was established.62
d) Intellectual Property Protection
The Advocate General supported the position of some Member States and held that 
EUSFTA addresses both commercial and non-commercial aspects of intellectual property 
but the CCP conferred only competences regarding commercial aspects on the EU. The 
main argument was that the EUSFTA referred to multilateral conventions in the context 
of IP and copyright, which include also provisions relating to moral rights.63 The Court 
opposed this argumentation and took the view that such reference by EUSFTA was 
58 This started early, see Joined Cases 21/72 to 24/72 International Fruit Company and Others, EU:C:1972:115, 
paras 10–18.
59 Opinion of the Court, para 248.
60 Opinion of the Court, para 247.
61 Opinion of the Court, para 76.
62 Opinion of the Court, paras 77 and 224.
63 See EUSFTA Article 10.24.
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not su_cient for the subject to be regarded as a component of the agreement. This 
reasoning suggests that only the content and inherent provisions of the agreement play 
a role in delimiting the competence of the EU. Other sources like conventions referred to 
by the text of EUSFTA, are irrelevant.64 The agreement itself does not contain provisions 
relating to moral rights. Therefore the Court concluded that the Chapter covered only 
the commercial aspects of IP rights and as a result, the EU enjoys exclusive competence 
for conclusion of Chapter Eleven.65
e) Trade and Sustainable Development
Disagreeing with the Advocate General, the Court saw the issues regarding trade and 
sustainable development covered by the CCP and the exclusive competence of the 
European Union. The conceptual framework of the Court’s reasoning in this respect was, 
#rst, underpinned by the Treaty provisions regarding horizontal principles and objectives 
of EU external relations. Those principles and objectives enshrined in Article 21(1) and 
(2) TEU include sustainable development linked to preservation and improvement of 
the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural 
resources. The CCP must be ‘guided’ by these principles and objectives.66 In view of the 
Court, these provisions establish an obligation on the EU to integrate these objectives 
and principles into the conduct of the CCP.67 The Court’s argument implies that the 
EU is obliged to include these provisions into the agreements to be concluded with 
third countries. The Court argued that the relevant provisions of the EUSFTA on trade 
and sustainable development have a direct and immediate e%ect on trade. The Court 
highlighted that in terms of a speci#c provision of EUSFTA it is undisputable that parties 
to the agreement did not want to encourage trade by reducing the levels of social and 
environmental protection in their respective territories below the standards laid down 
by international commitments or to apply those standards in a protectionist manner. 
The Court concluded that the sustainable development of the EUSFTA (Chapter Thirteen) 
falls within the CCP and, therefore, within the exclusive competence of the EU. 68
VI. Conclusions
The Opinion of the Court on the EUSFTA has made a novel contribution to a more 
precise separation of powers in the CCP, speci#cally regarding new generation trade 
agreements of the European Union. Delimiting clearly the competences in the areas of 
the CCP is vital for the Member States, as the exclusive competence character implies 
their sovereignty and autonomy not only in theoretical terms. The competence allocation 
64 Opinion of the Court, para 129.
65 Opinion of the Court, para 130.
66 Articles 205 and 207 (1) TFEU.
67 Opinion of the Court, paras 142–145.
68 Opinion of the Court, para 167.
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might have a number of practical consequences as well. Even though the TFEU already 
lays down the framework of competence allocation, it is obvious that the founding 
treaties can answer only the abstract-categorical questions concerning the separation of 
powers between the EU and Member States in the CCP. It is pressing, however, to reach 
beyond these abstract questions and de#ne the scope of the CCP in several matters, 
which might determine even the future of the external trade relations of the EU. From 
this point of view, it is strikingly important, how the emerging EU policy will gradually 
take the place of the Member States’ own investment policies, which are still anchored 
in their more than one thousand agreements concluded with third countries bilaterally.
Considering these expectations, the message of the Opinion seems to be clear. Despite 
the exclusive competence character of the CCP, the new generation agreements are not 
fully covered by the EU competence. Therefore these agreements will require also the 
rati#cation on behalf of the Member States. Early commentaries regarding the Opinion 
con#rmed a victory of the Member States in the competence debate. However, in the 
view of the present author, the picture may be much more sophisticated. First, the Court 
made evident the exclusivity of the EU competence in a number of areas, from services, 
over government procurement, to trade and sustainable development, among which 
the latter is, probably, of great importance. It does not a%ect only trade and environment 
issues. The Court’s argumentation pulls indeed the whole domain of horizontal principles 
and objectives into the center of the CCP, which evidently expresses the conviction, that 
the CCP is based not only on pure economic decisions, but it is guided by shared values.
 The mixed nature of the new generation agreements is telling not only with respect 
to the sovereignty of the Member States. It points also toward their legitimacy. In 
this perspective, the mixity can improve the legitimacy of the new generation trade 
agreements, as those must also be assessed by the national parliaments and rati#ed by 
the Member States. It must not be neglected, however, that the domestic rati#cation 
processes might be slowed down and that unforeseeable events can in&uence their 
outcome (see Wallonia’s rejection of CETA).
Since the FDI is undenyably covered by the exclusive EU competence, the status of the 
Member States’ extra-BITs are not implied essentially by the Opinion. The authorization 
under Regulation 1219/2012 is still relevant and enables the Member States to maintain 
the bilateral investment agreements in force until the Union concludes an agreement with 
the same third country. Even though the EU has already #nished investment negotiations 
– apart from Singapore – with Canada, Japan and Vietnam, the signature or rati#cation 
procedures are still pending at this time. Therefore the related BITs maintained by several 
Member States with the latter countries have not yet been replaced. Moreover, the 
Member States are able to open new negotiations on a BIT or to sign and conclude a new 
treaty with third countries even in the future, under the authorization of the Commission 
(until now, 17 extra-BITs or additional protocols have been signed by Member States). 
Even though these concerns indicate that it will take longer time to replace the Member 
States’ agreements, the Opinion made clear an important aspect of the replacement: 
the Court held that the EU has exclusive competence to terminate these agreements 
with respect to those provisions falling within the scope of FDI.
The Opinion left also questions unanswered regarding new generation trade 
agreements. Speci#cally, the EU competences regarding the ISDS mechanisms are 
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not fully clear yet. It was much disputed, whether Article 207 TFEU covers also the 
procedural aspects of the investment protection, i.e., whether the exclusive competence 
empowers the EU to participate in dispute settlement procedures established under the 
agreements. This issue implies also practical concerns, knowing that the investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms are sine qua non instruments of comprehensive 
investment protection. The Court only argued that the ISDS regime removes disputes 
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States. Therefore these provisions 
of EUSFTA cannot be concluded without the consent of the Member States. However, 
the ISDS mechanism, as a speci#c forum, has not been assessed profoundly by the 
Opinion. Speci#cally, the Investment Court System introduced in CETA raises questions 
of incompatibility with EU law. Therefore the ongoing procedure of Opinion 1/17 is 
expected to be decisive on these aspects of the new generation trade agreements and 
to move the CCP toward a more solid footing.
